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THE FUTURE OF INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION:  
GREATER TRANSPARENCY ON THE HORIZON FOR UNCITRAL RULES 
By  
Kristin A. Miller 
 
I. BACKGROUND ON INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 
 
“International investment arbitration is one of the fastest growing areas of 
international dispute resolution.”1 Investor-state arbitration involves the settlement 
of disputes arising out of international investment agreements, which are treaties 
formed between States for the reciprocal encouragement, promotion, and 
protection of investments.2 Presently, there are more than 2,500 international 
investment agreements in force around the world.3 These agreements take different 
forms, including bilateral investment treaties,4 double taxation treaties,5 and other 
bilateral and regional trade and investment agreements containing commitments to 
liberalize, protect, or promote investment.6 
                                                 
1 U.N. Commission on International Trade Law [UNCITRAL], Working Group II: 
Arbitration and Conciliation, Settlement of Commercial Disputes: Preparation of Rules of 
Uniform Law on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Dispute Settlement, Note by 
the Secretariat, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.160 (Aug. 5, 2010), available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/2Arbitration.html [follow 
the A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.160 hyperlink under 53rd Session 4-8 Oct., Vienna section] (last 
visited May 4, 2011). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 A bilateral investment treaty is an “[a]greement between two countries to ensure, among 
other things, that (1) investors of either country are allowed to hire top management 
personnel of any nationality, (2) have the right to make investment related transfers, (3) 
assets belonging to one country’s investors in the other country can only be expropriated in 
accordance with the international law, and (4) investors will have access to binding 
international arbitration in dispute settlement.” Business Dictionary, available at 
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/bilateral-investment-treaty.html (last visited 
Apr. 28, 2011). 
5 A double taxation treaty is a “[r]eciprocal arrangement between two countries not to retax 
the repatriated income that a firm or person domiciled in one country earned in (and paid 
taxes on) the other.” Business Dictionary, available at 
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/bilateral-investment-treaty.html (last visited 
Apr. 28, 2011). 
6 See supra note 1, at ¶ 3. 
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Although “[i]nternational investment agreements traditionally did not 
contain transparency provisions,”7 confidentiality has long been perceived as an 
implied term in international arbitration that flowed from the privacy of arbitral 
proceedings.8 “With the increase of investor-State arbitrations,” issues have been 
raised regarding availability of case information, access to awards, and public 
access to hearings,9 thus causing many to question the proposition of 
confidentiality. Transparency is considered a central aspect of good governance 
claims directed against States and private parties view it as an important 
characteristic of social responsibility.10 Investor-State arbitration has been targeted 
by transparency proposals because it involves public interest issues typically 
absent in other forms of commercial arbitration.11 Confidentiality, however, is 
generally regarded as an important feature of arbitration due to the need to protect 
business or governmental secrets and to protect proceedings from any outside 
pressures on the parties or the arbitration tribunal.12 The push for transparency in 
investor-State arbitration arises from the presence of a State in the arbitration and 
the subject-matter of the dispute, “which often raises questions of public policy, 
public interest, and the amount of potential liability.”13 This has led to a generally 
accepted need for greater transparency in investor-State arbitration.14   
                                                 
7 Id.  at ¶ 5. 
8 Id.  
9 Id. 
10 UNCITRAL, Working Group II: Arbitration and Conciliation, Settlement of Commercial 
Disputes: Preparation of Rules of Uniform Law on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-
State Dispute Settlement, Note by the Secretariat, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.160 
/Add. 1 (Aug. 5, 2010), available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/2Arbitration.html [follow 
the A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.160/Add.1 hyperlink under 53rd Session 4-8 Oct., Vienna section] 
(last visited May 4, 2011). 
11 J. Martin Hunter, Status of the Work of UNCITRAL’s Working Group II, Sept. 20, 2010, 
available at http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2010/09/20/status-of-the-work-of-
uncitrals-working-group-ii/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2011). 
12 See supra note 10, at ¶ 9. 
13 Id. 
14 Hunter, supra note 11. 




The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL) has recognized the need for greater transparency in investor-state 
arbitration and, at its forty-first session (New York, June 16-July 3, 2008) the 
Commission agreed that the topic should be dealt with as a matter of priority 
immediately after completion of the revision of the UNCITRAL Arbitral Rules.15 
The Commission agreed that the scope of the work must encompass the 
importance of ensuring transparency in investor-state arbitration.16 Various 
possible forms were envisaged by the Working Group at its forty-eighth session, 
including the preparation of instruments such as model clauses, specific rules or 
guidelines, an annex to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules in their generic form, 
separate arbitration rules, or optional clauses for adoption in specific treaties.17 The 
Commission decided, however, that it was too early to make a decision on the form 
of a future instrument and that broad discretion should be accorded to the Working 
Group in that respect.18 Members of the forty-first session outlined that the work 
on transparency should seek to accomplish five objectives:  
 
(1) creating public knowledge of the initiation of an investor-
State arbitration; (2) allowing third parties to make 
submissions to the tribunal where such submissions would 
be helpful and relevant and would not unduly delay, interfere 
with, or increase the costs of, the proceeding; (3) allowing 
open hearings; (4) making the decisions and awards of the 
tribunal public; and (5) preserving the existing power of an 
                                                 
15 See supra note 1, at ¶ 1. 
16 Id. 
17 UNCITRAL, Report of the Working Group on Arbitration and Conciliation on the Work 
of its Forty-Eighth Session (New York, 4-8 Feb. 2008), ¶ 69, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/646 (Feb. 
29, 2008), available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/2Arbitration.html [follow 
the A/CN.9/646 hyperlink under 48th Session 4-8 Feb., New York section] (last visited 
May 4, 2011).  
18 See supra note 1, at ¶ 1. 
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arbitral tribunal to allow closed proceedings and restrict 
access to documents, or portions thereof, when necessary to 
protect confidential business information and/or information 
that is privileges or otherwise protected from disclosure 
under the domestic law of the disputing State.19 
 
To help facilitate consideration of the issues surrounding transparency in treaty-
based arbitration by the Working Group, the Commission requested that the 
Secretariat “undertake preliminary research and compile information regarding 
current investor-state arbitration practices.”20 To accomplish this, the Secretariat 
distributed a questionnaire to all member States regarding their practices with 
respect to transparency in investor-state arbitration.21 The Commission urged 
member States to contribute broad information to the Secretariat regarding their 
practices.22 At its forty-third session (New York, June 21-July 9, 2010), the 
Commission entrusted the Working Group with the task of preparing a legal 
standard for transparency in investor-state arbitration.23   
 
II. CURRENT STATUS OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROVISIONS IN 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS AND ARBITRAL 
INSTITUTIONAL RULES 
 
 Dispute settlement provisions in international investment agreements 
addressing transparency typically contain provisions expressly on matters of public 
access to procedural documents, hearings, and awards.24 Typically, provisions 
                                                 
19 See supra note 10, at ¶12. 
20 See supra note 1, at ¶ 1. 
21 Id. (citing UNCITRAL, Officials Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-Third Session, 
Supplement No. 17, ¶ 314, U.N. Doc. A/63/17, available at 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/63/17%28SUPP%29 (last visited 
May 4, 2011)) [hereinafter UNCITRAL, Official Records]. 
22 Id. (citing UNCITRAL, Official Records, supra note 21, at ¶ 314). 
23 Id. at ¶ 2. 
24 Id. at ¶ 7. 




regarding public access to procedural documents provide that, absent party 
agreement to the contrary, documents submitted to, or issued by, the tribunal shall 
be publicly available, subject to the redaction of confidential information.25 In an 
effort to further facilitate transparency, many treaty and institutional rule 
provisions provide that a party who submits a document alleged to contain 
confidential information must also submit to the tribunal a copy of that document 
with the confidential information removed so that it may be disseminated to the 
public. For example, Article 38(3)-(8) of Canada’s Model Foreign Investment 
Promotion and Protection Agreement (FIPA),26 Article 29(1) of the United States 
                                                 
25 See supra note 1, at ¶ 7. 
26 Canada’s Model Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (FIPA), Art. 
29(1), available at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/assets/pdfs/2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf  (last visited Apr. 28, 2011): 
3. All documents submitted to, or issued by, the Tribunal shall be 
publicly available, unless the disputing parties otherwise agree, 
subject to the deletion of confidential information.  
4. Notwithstanding paragraph 3, any Tribunal award under this 
Section shall be publicly available, subject to the deletion of 
confidential information.  
5. A disputing party may disclose to other persons in connection 
with the arbitral proceedings such unredacted [sic] documents as it 
considers necessary for the preparation of its case, but it shall 
ensure that those persons protect the confidential information in 
such documents.  
6. The Parties may share with officials of their respective federal 
and sub-national governments all relevant unredacted [sic] 
documents in the course of dispute settlement under this 
Agreement, but they shall ensure that those persons protect any 
confidential information in such documents.  
7. As provided under Article 10(4) and (5), the Tribunal shall not 
require a Party to furnish or allow access to information the 
disclosure of which would impede law enforcement or would be 
contrary to the Party’s law protecting Cabinet confidences, 
personal privacy or the financial affairs and accounts of individual 
customers of financial institutions, or which it determines to be 
contrary to its essential security.  
8. To the extent that a Tribunal’s confidentiality order designates 
information as confidential and a Party’s law on access to 
information requires public access to that information, the Party’s 
law on access to information shall prevail. However, a Party 
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of America Model Treaty concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investment (US Model BIT),27 and the North American Free Trade 
Alliance (NAFTA) Notes of Interpretation28 all contain provisions to this effect.29   
 “Provisions on public access to procedural documents typically include 
either a general statement on publicity of all procedural documents or a list of 
procedural documents that should be made publicly available.”30 Where procedural 
documents are listed, the following are typically included: request for arbitration, 
notice of arbitration, pleadings, briefs submitted to the tribunal by a disputing party 
and any written submissions, minutes or transcripts of hearings of the tribunal, and 
                                                                                                                            
should endeavour [sic] to apply its law on access to information so 
as to protect information designated confidential by the Tribunal. 
FIPA art.29(1). 
27 United States of America Model Treaty concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investment (US Model BIT), available at 
www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601.pdf (last visited Apr. 28, 2011): 
1. Subject to paragraphs 2 and 4, the respondent shall, after 
receiving the following documents, promptly transmit them to the 
non-disputing Party and make them available to the public:  
(a) the notice of intent;  
(b) the notice of arbitration;  
(c) pleadings, memorials, and briefs submitted to the tribunal by a 
disputing party and any written submissions submitted pursuant to 
Article 28(2) [Non-Disputing Party submissions] and (3) [Amicus 
Submissions] and Article 33 [Consolidation];  
(d) minutes or transcripts of hearings of the tribunal, where 
available; and  
(e) orders, awards, and decisions of the tribunal. 
U.S. Model BIT. 
28 North American Free Trade Alliance (NAFTA), Notes of Interpretation, available at 
http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/en/view.aspx?x=343&mtpiID=142 (last visited Apr. 28, 
2011).  
29 Other examples of such provisions can be found in: Article 10.12 of the Free Trade 
Agreement between the U.S., Central America and the Dom. Rep. (CAFTA-DR), available 
at www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RL31870.pdf (last visited Apr. 28, 2011); 
Chapter 11, Article 26 of the Agreement Establishing the Asean-Austl.-N.Z. Free Trade 
Area (AANZFTA), available at www.aseansec.org/22260.pdf (last visited Apr. 28, 2011); 
Article 94(4) of the Japan-Mex. Free Trade Agreement, available at 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/latin/mexico/agreement/index.html (last visited Apr. 28, 
2011); Article 7(2) of the Sing.-Austrl. Free Trade Agreement, available at 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/australia_singapore_agreement.html (last visited 
Apr. 28, 2011). 
30 See supra note 1, at ¶ 9. 




orders, awards, and decisions of the tribunal.31 Where provisions provide for the 
dissemination of documents, responsibility for making that information available 
to the public may lie either with the tribunal or the parties.32 Typically, provisions 
do not specify the manner in which information is to be conveyed to the public; 
provisions that do address the issue differ as to whether each party has the right to 
make all arbitral documents public or only their own.33 Moreover, these provisions 
usually do not specify a time frame in which publication must be achieved, but 
rather simply state that the information shall be made available “in a timely 
manner.”34   
 Open hearing provisions are found in several international investor-State 
agreements.  These provisions provide that arbitral hearings shall be open to the 
public and subject to the protection of confidential information.35 Issues 
surrounding protection of confidential information are particularly prevalent when 
the arbitration deals with matters threatening national security and other 
government secrets. The tribunal has discretion to decide which measures are to be 
implemented to protect confidential information.36 
 Arbitral institution rules typically do not address the issues of public 
access to procedural documents, hearings, or awards, but rather leave these matters 
to party agreement.37 The current UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules provide that 





35 See supra note 1, at ¶ 23. 
36 Id., see e.g. Article 38(1) of Canada’s FIPA, available at 
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/2004-
FIPA-model-en.pdf (last visited Apr. 28, 2011) and Article 29(2) of the US Model BIT, 
available at www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601.pdf (last visited Apr. 28, 
2011). 
37 See supra note 1, at ¶ 29.  
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awards may be made public only with consent of all parties involved38 and 
hearings shall be held in camera unless the parties agree otherwise.39 Similarly, the 
London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) Rules40 and the Arbitration 
Rules of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC)41 
make disclosure of documents and openness of hearings subject of party choice. 
The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Arbitration Rules take the decision 
outside of the parties’ hands by providing, in Article 21(3), that persons not 
involved in the proceedings shall not be admitted into the hearings without the 
Tribunal’s approval.42 An exception to the general treatment of transparency is 
found in the arbitral rules of the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID), which permits immediate publication of general 
information about arbitral proceedings, including requests for arbitration, 
beginning and end dates of proceedings, and the tribunal’s legal reasoning. 43 
                                                 
38 UNCITRAL Arbitral Rules Art. 34(5) (2010), available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1976Arbitration_rules.html 
(last visited Apr. 28, 2011). 
39 Id. at 25(4). 
40 See London Court of Arbitration Rules Art. 30.1 (document disclosure), 30.3 (document 
disclosure), and 19.4 (open hearings), available at 
http://www.lcia.org/Dispute_Resolution_Services/LCIA_Arbitration_Rules.aspx (last 
visited Apr. 28, 2011).  
41 Arbitration Rules of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce 
(SCC), available at 
http://www.sccinstitute.com/filearchive/3/35894/K4_Skiljedomsregler%20eng%20ARB%2
0TRYCK_1_100927.pdf (last visited Apr. 28, 2011).  
42 International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), Arbitration Rules, art 21(3), available at 
http://www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/Court/Arbitration/other/rules_arb_english.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 28, 2011).  
43 International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), Arbitral Rules, 
available at 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=ShowH
ome&pageName=Rules_Home (last visited Apr. 28, 2011) (Regulation 22 provides: “The 
Secretary-General shall appropriately publish information about the operation of the 
Centre, including the registration of all requests for conciliation or arbitration and in due 
course an indication of the date and method of the termination of each proceeding. 2. If 
both parties to a proceeding consent to the publication of: (a) reports of Conciliation 
Commissions; (b) arbitral awards; or (c) the minutes and other records of proceedings, the 
Secretary-General shall arrange for the publication thereof, in an appropriate form with a 
view to furthering the development of international law in relation to investments.” ICSID 





III. RECENT DECISIONS INVOLVING TRANSPARENCY-RELATED ISSUES 
 
Due to the general lack of guidance within existing arbitral rules and 
legislation within contracting parties’ agreements for dealing with transparency 
issues, tribunal decisions evidence an ad hoc approach.44 Tribunals addressing the 
issue of confidentiality have held that a general principle of confidentiality does 
not exist in investor-State arbitration.45 For example, in Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, 
a NAFTA arbitration tribunal operating under the ICSID Arbitral Rules stated that 
“[t]hough it is frequently said that one of the reasons for recourse to arbitration is 
to avoid publicity, unless the agreement between the parties incorporates such a 
limitation, each of them is free to speak publicly of the arbitration.”46 The Tribunal 
held that there was neither any general duty of confidentiality nor any general rule 
of transparency in ICSID arbitral proceedings; therefore, it was the responsibility 
of each tribunal to find the appropriate balance between confidentiality and 
transparency.47 When dealing specifically with the issue of document 
dissemination and public attendance at hearings, tribunals have held under the 
                                                                                                                            
Rule 48(4) further provides that “[t]he Centre shall not publish the award without the 
consent of the parties,” but that even without the parties’ consent “[t]he Centre 
shall…promptly include in its publications excerpts of the legal reasoning of the tribunal.”  
Concerning open hearings, ICSID Rule 32(2) provides that the Tribunal, after consultation 
with the Secretary-General and absent objection by either party, may allow third persons to 
attend arbitral proceedings, subject to the implementation of logistical arrangements to 
protect confidential information). 
44 See supra note 10, at ¶ 5. 
45 See e.g., S.D. Myers Inc. v. Gov’t of Canada, available at 
http://www.naftaclaims.com/disputes_canada_sdmyers.htm (last visited Apr. 28, 2011). 
46 See Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, Case No. ARB(AF)/97/, Award of Aug. 30, 2000, 16 
ICSID Review 168 (2001); 40 ILM 36 (2001) ¶ 13, available at 
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/MetacladAward-English.pdf (last visited Apr. 28, 2011). 
47 Id. at ¶ 45-51. 
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current UNCITRAL rules that these matters are left to the agreement of the 
parties.48  
The precedential case for transparency in investor-State arbitration was 
United Parcel Service of America, Inc. v. Government of Canada.49 In an April 
2003 Procedural Order, the Tribunal permitted public disclosure by either 
disputing party of the pleadings and submissions of any disputing party.50 More 
recently, in Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, an ICSID tribunal operating under 
the UNCITRAL Rules granted five public interest groups leave to file amicus 
submissions.51 In addition, Canada currently has six pending cases that deal with 
transparency-related issues.52 
 
                                                 
48 See e.g., Methanex Corp. v. U.S., Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from Third 
Persons to Intervene as Amici Curiae, (Jan. 15, 2001) (holding that because article 25(4) of 
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules provide that hearings are to be held in camera, the 
petitioners could not be granted the right to attend oral hearings of the arbitration, but 
public attendance could be had if the parties agreed to such attendance); S.D. Myers, 
available at http://www.naftaclaims.com/disputes_canada_sdmyers.htm (last visited Apr. 
28, 2011) (holding that disclosure or confidentiality was to be determined by the agreement 
of the disputing parties as recorded in the order regarding disclosure and confidentiality); 
United Postal Serv. of America., Inc. v. Gov’t of Can., Decision of the Tribunal on 
Petitions for Intervention and Participation as Amici Curiae (Oct. 17, 2001), available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/6033.pdf (holding that UNCITRAL Rule 
25(4) prevented third parties or their representatives from attending hearings in the absence 
of both parties agreeing thereto) (last visited Apr. 28, 2011).  
49 United Postal Serv. of Am., available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/6033.pdf; UNCITRAL, Working Group II: 
Arbitration and Conciliation, Settlement of Commercial Disputes: Transparency in Treaty-
Based Investor-State Arbitration, Compilation of Comments by Governments, Note by the 
Secretariat, ¶ 1(6-7), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.159/Add. 1 (Aug. 4, 2010), available 
at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/2Arbitration.html 
[follow the A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.159/Add.1 hyperlink under 53rd Session 4-8 Oct., Vienna 
section] (last visited May 4, 2011).  
50 Id. 
51 UNCITRAL, Working Group II: Arbitration and Conciliation, Settlement of Commercial 
Disputes: Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration, Compilation of 
Comments by Governments, Note by the Secretariat, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.159/Add. 3 (Aug. 4, 2010), available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/2Arbitration.html [follow 
the A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.159/Add.3 hyperlink under 53rd Session 4-8 Oct., Vienna section] 
(last visited May 4, 2011). 
52 Id. at ¶ 4. 




IV. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE UNCITRAL SECRETARIAT FOR THE 
WORKING GROUP 
 
Recognizing that both “transparency and confidentiality can be considered 
as legitimate interests of investor-State [] arbitrations,” the UNCITRAL Secretariat 
recommended that the Working Group strike a balance that protects both 
interests.53 To this end, the Secretary recommended that the Working Group 
consider the following issues in relation to the scope of work on procedural 
transparency: (1) persons or institutions concerned; (2) information subject to 
publicity; (3) recipients of information; (4) open hearings; and (5) submissions by 
third parties.54 In addition to these specific areas of consideration, the Secretariat 
suggested that the Working Group determine whether it should draft a model 
clause on transparency for inclusion in dispute settlement provisions of 
international investment agreements, specific arbitration rules addressing 
transparency in treaty-based investor-State arbitration, or guidelines to provide 
guidance to States when negotiating international investment treaties.55 
In addressing the persons or institutions concerned, the Secretariat 
recommended that the Working Group consider “how provisions on transparency 
should determine the rights and obligations of each of the persons involved in the 
arbitration proceedings.”56 In particular, the Secretariat recommended clarifying 
whether the parties to the dispute, the arbitral tribunal, or the arbitral institution 
should be in charge of conveying information to the public.57 The extent to which 
parties may engage in general discussion about the case in public or make 
disclosures, and whether publication should be automatic or discretionary were 
additional recommended topics for consideration.58   
                                                 
53 See supra note 10, at ¶ 10. 
54 Id. at ¶ 12-21. 
55 Id. at ¶ 23-31. 
56 Id. at ¶ 13. 
57 Id. at ¶ 14. 
58 See supra note 10, at ¶ 14.  
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For information subject to publicity, the Secretariat recommended that the 
Working Group consider “whether there should be a general rule regarding public 
access to procedural documents and arbitral awards,” or this should be a matter left 
to party choice.59 More specifically, the Secretariat recommended that the question 
of whether provisions of public access to procedural documents should be drafted 
in the form of a general statement or a list of procedural documents to be made 
publicly available.60 Given the issues involved in many investor-State arbitrations, 
the Secretariat recommended that the Working Group consider “whether and to 
what extent documents revealing business secrets or other confidential information 
should be exempt from possible public disclosure” and “whether additional 
guidance should be provided.”61 
In determining the recipients of disclosed information, the Secretariat 
recommended that the Working Group consider various approaches instead of 
simply declaring that documents will or will not be disclosed to the public.62 These 
approaches included ruling that disclosure be limited to non-disputing 
governments or broadened to include the public at large.63 Similarly, in 
determining whether hearings should be open to the public, the Secretariat 
recommended that, if an affirmative decision was reached on this issue, the 
Working Group consider whether guidance should be provided to the arbitral 
tribunal on the organization of open hearings, accounting for the need to protect 
confidential information.64 
                                                 
59 Id. at ¶ 15. 
60 Id. at ¶ 16 (Documents found by the Secretariat to be most deserving of attention are: 
“[T]he notice of arbitration and the response thereto; the minutes or records of hearings; 
any of the documents produced in the arbitral proceedings by the parties, whether pursuant 
to a disclosure exercise or otherwise; any of the pleadings or written memorials (and any 
attached witness statements or expert reports); correspondence between the parties and/or 
the arbitral tribunal exchanged in respect (sic) of the arbitral proceedings, decisions, orders 
or directions of the arbitral tribunal; and awards.”). 
61 Id. at ¶ 17. 
62 Id. at ¶ 18. 
63 See supra note 10, at ¶ 18. 
64 Id. at ¶ 19. 




Lastly, in addressing whether submissions by third parties should be 
permitted, the Secretariat recommended that the Working Group consider criteria 
for third party submissions, such as the extent of possible intervention, the form 
and content of submissions, whether the arbitral must provide grounds for 
submission refusal, and the conditions for allowing submission publication.65 
 
V. COMMENTS BY MEMBER STATES ON TRANSPARENCY IN INVESTOR-STATE 
ARBITRATION  
 
In order to elicit member State participation in transparency-related 
decisions, the Secretariat distributed a questionnaire to each State, containing 
questions about investor-State arbitration transparency practices currently in 
place.66 In his recommendation, the Secretariat suggested that the Working Group 
look to the practices currently in place in member States to facilitate striking the 
                                                 
65 Id. at ¶ 21. 
66 UNCITRAL, Working Group II: Arbitration and Conciliation, Settlement of Commercial 
Disputes: Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration, Compilation of 
Comments by Governments, Note by the Secretariat, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.159 (Aug. 4, 2010), available 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/2Arbitration.html [follow 
the A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.159 hyperlink under 53rd Session 4-8 Oct., Vienna section] (last 
visited May 4, 2011) (The questionnaire contained the following five questions: “(1) Could 
you provide examples of treaty-based investor-State arbitration cases in your country 
involving instances of publicity or transparency of the arbitral proceedings (for example, 
cases where information regarding the existence of the arbitral proceedings would be made 
publicly available, or where the possibility would exist for the public or specific interest 
groups to obtain access to documents used in the arbitral proceedings, or to be present at 
hearings)?”; “(2) Are there any examples in your country of cases where third parties have 
presented statements in the course of treaty-based investment arbitration (such as amicus 
curiae briefs) or have otherwise intervened in the proceedings?”; “(3) Is there any provision 
concerning transparency or publicity regarding treaty-based investment arbitration in 
bilateral or multilateral treaties or agreements entered into by your country? If so, could 
you please provide us with the texts of such treaties or agreements, or any information 
relating thereto?”; “(4) Is there a provision for third parties to become involved in treaty-
based investment arbitration in bilateral or multilateral treaties or agreements entered into 
by your country? If so, could you please provide us with the texts of such treaties or 
agreements, or any information relating thereto?”; and “(5) Do you have any comments 
regarding current practices with respect to publicity or transparency in treaty-based 
investor-State arbitration involving your country?”). 
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proper balance between public interest and the need to protect confidentiality.67 
This section will discuss the responses from member States to show the variety of 
practices and opinions currently held regarding transparency in investor-State 
arbitration. 
In Armenia, the public is informed about arbitral proceedings by the mass 
media, but it is not possible for the public or specific interest groups to obtain 
access to documents used in the arbitral proceedings or to be present at hearings.68 
Similarly, Canada provides public notice of the existence of all its investor-State 
arbitrations via the website of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International 
Trade.69 Also posted on this site are all arbitral documents that Canada is permitted 
to publish pursuant to each Tribunal’s Procedural Orders.70 Turkey permits 
individuals to obtain information about investor-State arbitrations involving 
Turkey upon written request.71 Conversely, Bahrain72, China73, and the Czech 
Republic74 keep even the existence of investor-State arbitrations confidential.   
The majority of member States reported that there had been no cases in 
which third parties presented statements in the course of treaty-based investor-
                                                 
67 See supra note 10, at ¶ 11. 
68 See supra note 66, at ¶ 5 (noting that Poland also informs the public of general 
information relating to investor-State arbitrations through the press and keeps all other 
information confidential). See supra note 51, at ¶ 1. 
69 UNCITRAL, Working Group II: Arbitration and Conciliation, Settlement of Commercial 
Disputes: Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration, Compilation of 
Comments by Governments, Note by the Secretariat, ¶ 1(5), U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.159/Add. 1 (Aug. 4, 2010), available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/2Arbitration.html [follow 
the A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.159/Add.1 hyperlink under 53rd Session 4-8 Oct., Vienna section] 
(last visited May 4, 2011) (referencing Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, 
available at http://www.international.gc.ca/international/index.aspx (last visited Apr. 28, 
2011) [hereinafter Foreign Affairs]). 
70 Id. 
71 See supra note 51, at ¶5 (citing Turkey, Law No. 4982 of 09.10.2003). 
72 See supra note 66, at ¶ 5. 
73 See supra note 69, at ¶ 2. 
74 See supra note 69, at ¶ 3. 




State arbitration;75 however, a few countries have permitted such statements to be 
submitted.76 For example, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
to which both Canada and the United States are parties, has been expanded by the 
NAFTA Free Trade Commission in its Statement on Non-Disputing Party 
participation, which provides guidelines for a Tribunal considering amicus curiae 
briefs in Chapter 11 arbitrations.77 In its response, Canada asserted that its 
experience with amicus curiae submissions “establishes that public participation in 
treaty-based investor-State arbitration can be effectively managed by a Tribunal to 
ensure that it benefits rather than burdens the process.”78 
Similarly, the majority of member States do not provide for third-party 
participation in investor-State arbitrations.79 Several states, however, do provide 
                                                 
75 See e.g., UNCITRAL, Working Group II: Arbitration and Conciliation, Settlement of 
Commercial Disputes: Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration, 
Compilation of Comments by Governments, Note by the Secretariat, ¶¶ 2-5, 7, 9, 11, U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.159/Add. 4 (Aug. 4, 2010), available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/2Arbitration.html [follow 
the A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.159/Add.4 hyperlink under 53rd Session 4-8 Oct., Vienna section] 
(last visited May 4, 2011); See supra note 66, at ¶¶ 1, 3; See supra note 51, at ¶¶ 2-5. 
(noting that Algeria, Armenia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Finland, France 
Germany, Iraq, Luxembourg, Norway, Russia, Spain, Tunisia and Turkey have not joined 
third parties).  
76 See e.g., supra note 66, at ¶ 2; supra note 69, at ¶ 1; UNCITRAL, Working Group II: 
Arbitration and Conciliation, Settlement of Commercial Disputes: Transparency in Treaty-
Based Investor-State Arbitration, Compilation of Comments by Governments, Note by the 
Secretariat, ¶6, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.159/Add. 4 (Aug. 4, 2010), available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/2Arbitration.html [follow 
the A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.159/Add.4 hyperlink under 53rd Session 4-8 Oct., Vienna section] 
(last visited May 4, 2011); supra note 51, at ¶ 1; supra note 51, at ¶ 6 (noting that 
Argentina, Canada, Greece, Poland and the United States allow such submissions).   
77 See supra note 69, at ¶ 1(12) (these guidelines provide that submission are to be written, 
no longer than 20 pages, and concern issues within the scope of the arbitration).  
78 See supra note 69, at ¶14. 
79 UNCITRAL, Working Group II: Arbitration and Conciliation, Settlement of Commercial 
Disputes: Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration, Compilation of 
Comments by Governments, Note by the Secretariat, ¶¶ 1-3, 6, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.159/Add. 4 (Aug. 4, 2010), available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/2Arbitration.html [follow 
the A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.159/Add.4 hyperlink under 53rd Session 4-8 Oct., Vienna section] 
(last visited May 4, 2011); supra note 75, at ¶¶ 3, 6-9; supra note 51, at ¶¶ 1-4 (noting that 
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for such participation. For example, the Chile-Australia FTA investor-State dispute 
settlement provisions allows the arbitral tribunal to accept written submissions and 
arguments of third parties that may assist the tribunal in evaluating the submissions 
and arguments of the disputing parties.80 Other countries, though not specifically 
providing for third-party participation in their treaties, reference international 
arbitration bodies in their treaties that do permit third-party participation. For 
example, Mauritius references UNCITRAL and ICSID.81 
Canada and the United States lead the way in including provisions 
providing for transparency in their investor-State treaties. Both countries have 
adopted NAFTA, which requires that non-disputing NAFTA parties receive notice 
of any arbitration, copies of all pleadings, evidence tendered, and copies of the 
written arguments of disputing parties.82 In addition, the Dominican Republic-
Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) provides in 
Article 10.20 for acceptance and consideration of “amicus curiae submissions from 
a person or entity that is not a disputing party.”83   
Several countries offered additional comments concerning their thoughts 
on greater transparency in investor-State arbitration. The majority of member 
                                                                                                                            
Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Belarus, Finland, Greece, Iraq, Lebanon, Luxembourg, 
Poland, Russia, Spain and Tunisia do not provide for third-party participation.).  
80 Chile-Austl. Free-Trade Agreement Article 10.20.2, available at 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/chile/fta/FTA_Text_10.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2011). 
81 UNCITRAL, Working Group II: Arbitration and Conciliation, Settlement of Commercial 
Disputes: Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration, Compilation of 
Comments by Governments, Note by the Secretariat, ¶¶ 4-5, 10, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.159/Add. 4 (Aug. 4, 2010), available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/2Arbitration.html [follow 
the A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.159/Add.4 hyperlink under 53rd Session 4-8 Oct., Vienna section] 
(last visited May 4, 2011) (noting that France and Germany refer to ICSID); supra note 51, 
at ¶ 5 (noting that Turkey refers to ICSID). 
82 See supra note 69, at ¶ 1(21). 
83 UNCITRAL, Working Group II: Arbitration and Conciliation, Settlement of Commercial 
Disputes: Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration, Compilation of 
Comments by Governments, Note by the Secretariat, ¶¶ 2, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.159/Add. 4 (Aug. 4, 2010), available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/2Arbitration.html [follow 
the A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.159/Add.4 hyperlink under 53rd Session 4-8 Oct., Vienna section] 
(last visited May 4, 2011) (citing CAFTA-DR, supra note 29). 




States expressed support for the proposition. For example, Canada stated that it 
“believes UNCITRAL must somehow provide for transparency in investor-State 
arbitration, and that it must do so as soon as possible.”84 In addition, Tunisia 
expressed support by stating, “[P]ublication of arbitral awards…is important for 
enabling States to follow the development of a case and get to know the 
interpretations put on the provisions of treaties…by international arbitrators.” 85 
Turkey, while supportive of the idea, insists that party choice should control the 
extent of transparency in investor-State arbitration.86 Other States, however, are not 
supportive of inserting transparency in investor-State arbitration. Bahrain asserted, 
“in order to prevent the gradual irrelevance and desuetude of the UNCITRAL 
rules, [it] would resist any attempt to incorporate transparency provisions;” 
however, it would support the consideration of model clauses for possible use in 
individual instruments.87 Similarly, China stated it does not “consider it 
appropriate to impose provisions of publicity and transparency on treaty-based 




International investment arbitration deals with matters of public interest; 
therefore, it has been argued by many that investor-State arbitration should be 
more transparent. Based on the comments received by the UNCITRAL Working 
Group, it is likely that some type of change will be made in the UNCITRAL 
Arbitral Rules to help increase transparency. Although several States were not 
supportive of the adoption of mandatory transparency rules, this is not likely to 
                                                 
84 See supra note 69, at ¶ 3. 
85 See supra note 51, at ¶ 4. 
86 See supra note 51, at ¶5. 
87 See supra note 66, at ¶5. 
88 See supra note 69, at ¶ 2. 
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deter the Working Group from promulgating rules; however, it may cause the 
Group to make those rules applicable only by party choice. 
 
 
 
 
